feat(auth): mint Docker tokens from the stored access token - #3935
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dgageot wants to merge 4 commits into
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feat(auth): mint Docker tokens from the stored access token#3935dgageot wants to merge 4 commits into
dgageot wants to merge 4 commits into
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aheritier
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area/cli
Sayt-0
approved these changes
Aug 6, 2026
aheritier
approved these changes
Aug 6, 2026
Docker Desktop's backend API only hands out its own access token — valid for 15 minutes — and never the refresh token behind it, so an expired JWT cannot be renewed: a stuck refresher on Desktop's side leaves every caller with the same dead token. The access token `docker login` (and Desktop's own sign-in) leaves in the credential store is long-lived, and Docker Hub exchanges it for a fresh token with no user interaction. This package owns that exchange: an in-memory token renewed ahead of its expiry, credential re-checks so a logout or an account switch is noticed, a shared cache so sibling processes don't each mint their own, retries for transient failures (honouring Retry-After), a long back-off when the token is refused, issuer and audience validation, and clock-skew correction learned from Hub's Date header so expiry decisions follow the issuer's clock rather than a drifting local one. The access token itself never leaves the process except in the exchange request: the endpoint is pinned to a Docker host, redirects are not followed, and account passwords are never sent. Set DOCKER_AGENT_NO_TOKEN_EXCHANGE to opt out entirely.
Gateway clients are rebuilt for every request and each one asks for a token, so every LLM call used to pay a round-trip to Docker Desktop over its socket: the token is now kept in memory until it nears its expiry. A token that is about to expire counts as unusable — it would die mid-request — and when Desktop has nothing usable to offer, minting from the stored access token comes before nudging Desktop: it needs nothing from Desktop and, unlike a forced refresh, is deterministic. A token Docker refused is never served again, however healthy Desktop believes it to be. GetTokenWithSource reports where a token came from, and the signed-in account is now read from the token's claims when Desktop isn't around to be asked, so DOCKER_USERNAME and DOCKER_EMAIL also resolve on a plain `docker login`.
A 401 from the gateway is a more reliable signal than local expiry arithmetic, which a skewed clock, a stale cache or a revoked session can all get wrong. Gateway-bound clients now forget the rejected token, ask for a fresh one and replay the request once — bodies that cannot be rewound and requests that presented no token are left alone.
`docker agent debug auth` now shows whether the token came from Docker Desktop or was minted from the stored access token — the first thing to know when the gateway rejects it. The doctor issue no longer implies Docker Desktop is the only way to sign in.
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Docker Desktop's backend API only hands out its own access token — valid
for 15 minutes — and never the refresh token behind it, so an expired JWT
cannot be renewed: a stuck refresher on Desktop's side leaves every
caller with the same dead token. The access token
docker login(andDesktop's own sign-in) leaves in the credential store is long-lived, and
Docker Hub exchanges it for a fresh token with no user interaction.
This package owns that exchange: an in-memory token renewed ahead of its
expiry, credential re-checks so a logout or an account switch is noticed,
a shared cache so sibling processes don't each mint their own, retries
for transient failures (honouring Retry-After), a long back-off when the
token is refused, issuer and audience validation, and clock-skew
correction learned from Hub's Date header so expiry decisions follow the
issuer's clock rather than a drifting local one.
The access token itself never leaves the process except in the exchange
request: the endpoint is pinned to a Docker host, redirects are not
followed, and account passwords are never sent. Set
DOCKER_AGENT_NO_TOKEN_EXCHANGE to opt out entirely.